Labor Law—Railway Labor Act—Procedure for Settlement of Minor Disputes.— Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng\u27rs v. Louisville & N.R R by De Ambrose, Joseph L
Boston College Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 2 Article 29
1-1-1964
Labor Law—Railway Labor Act—Procedure for
Settlement of Minor Disputes.— Brotherhood of
Locomotive Eng'rs v. Louisville & N.R R
Joseph L. De Ambrose
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph L. De Ambrose, Labor Law—Railway Labor Act—Procedure for Settlement of Minor Disputes.— Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs
v. Louisville & N.R R, 5 B.C.L. Rev. 446 (1964), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol5/iss2/29
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
section 14(b) deals only with the actual negotiation and execution of agree-
ments proscribed by state law, whereas the enjoining of any conduct which
the State finds has a tendency to bring about the execution of a union-
security contract remains exclusively in the federal domain.' This inter-
pretation would result in the incongruous possibility that a State might
enjoin an employer from executing a union-security contract proscribed by
state law, yet the State would be powerless to prevent a union from exercis-
ing economic pressures, such as picketing, to compel the employer to violate
the state court's decree. 42
The Court's line separating federal and state power is a tenuous one,
at best, and it may take several more decisions before the demarcation line
is clearly and conclusively established. In defense of the Court, it is sub-
mitted that, by enacting section 14(b), Congress did not intend to allow
states only to enact substantive law prohibiting union-security contracts
while reserving the enforcement of such laws to a federal agency; thus, the
Court was correct in ruling that states may enforce their right-to-work laws.
On .the other hand, if the Court concluded that states also had the power to
enjoin activity such as picketing, which might eventually lead to a violation
of a state's right-to-work law, then it would have had to overrule the many
cases in which it had previously held that a state cannot interfere with the
exercise of the federal right to engage in strikes, peaceful picketing or other
concerted activities. 43 Consequently, the line of demarcation drawn by the
Court, while tenuous, is perhaps a most practical one.
EDWARD M. BLOOM
Labor Law—Railway Labor Act—Procedure for Settlement of Minor
Disputes.—Brotherbood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Louisville S N.R.R. 1—
Injunctive relief was sought by the railroad to enjoin a strike threatened by
the union to enforce an award granted to the union by the National Railroad
Adjustment Board under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. 2 An
employee of the railroad had been fired for misconduct and his union pro-
tested. Confronted with a strike, the railroad submitted the dispute to the
Adjustment Board' which rendered an award ordering the railroad to rein-
41 Ibid.
42
 Reply Brief for Petitioner on Reargument, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625
v. Schermerhorn, supra note 16, p. 21.
43
 E.g., Farnsworth & Chambers Co. v. Local Union 429, 201 Tenn. 329, 299 S.W.2d
8 (1957), rev'd, 353 U.S. 969 (1957); Local Union 438, Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union
v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
1 373 U.S. 33 (1963).
2 44 Stat. 587 (1934), 45 US.C. II 153-159 (1958). Section 151(a) provides:
The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce
or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; . . . (4) to provide for
the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settle-
ment of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or
application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.
3 44 Stat. 587 (1934), 45 U.S.C. I 153 First(i):
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state the employee with pay for time lost. 4 A further dispute developed
when the railroad refused to accede to the union's demand for full back pay
without deduction of outside income of the employee, and the union threatened
to strike. The union insisted that the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act5 militated against the issuance of an injunction to enjoin the threatened
The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or
carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application
of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, . . . shall
be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer
of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an
adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the
parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board
with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the
disputes.
Section 153 First relates only to so-called "minor" disputes, to be distinguished from
major disputes.
The [latter] present the large issues about which strikes ordinarily arise with
the consequent interruptions of traffic that the Act sought to avoid. Because
they more often involve those consequences and because they seek to create
rather than to enforce contractual rights, they have been left for settlement
entirely to the processes of noncompulsory adjustment.
The so-called minor disputes, on the other hand, involving grievances,
affect the smaller differences which inevitably appear in the carrying out of
major agreements and policies or arise incidentally in the course of employment.
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723-24 (1945). See Comment, 60 Colum.
L. Rev. 381 (1960).
4 44 Stat. 587 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First(m) and (o).
(m) The awards of the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall be stated
in writing. A copy of the awards shall be furnished to the respective parties
to the controversy, and the awards shall be final and binding upon both parties
to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award . . . .
(o) In case of an award by any division of the Adjustment Board in favor
of petitioner, the division of the Board shall make an order, directed to the
carrier, to make the award effective and, if the award includes a requirement
for the payment of money, to pay to the employee the sum to which he is
entitled under the award on or before a day named.
5 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1958). The public policy of the
Act is declared in § 102:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of govern-
mental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other
forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is com-
monly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom
of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment,
wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows,
it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of his own choosing; to negotiate the terms and
conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation
of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection;
therefore, the following definitions of and limitations upon the jurisdiction and
authority of the courts of the United States are enacted.
Section 101 states:
No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in strict conformity with
447
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strike, that the mechanism for judicial enforcement of such awards provided
under the RLA° was not mandatory, and that it did not preclude resort
to economic self-help. The district court' granted the injunction and the
court of appeals affirmed .° On certiorari to the Supreme Court, HELD: The
issuance of the injunction was proper. The legislative history of the RLA
indicates a clear purpose that the statutory grievance procedure of section 153
First was to provide a "mandatory, exclusive, and comprehensive system
for resolving grievance disputes " The grievance procedures were designed
as a compulsory substitute for self-help, and not merely as a voluntary
alternative to it. To prevent emasculation of the grievance procedure, the
general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act must be accommodated to
the later and more specific provisions of the RLA.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg contended that since
money awards of the Adjustment Board are expressly not final and binding,
they are not within the compulsory arbitration scheme of the grievance
procedure. Injunctions against strikes protesting a denial of a money award,
or attempting to enforce the allowance of a money award, should not be
granted in view of the imbalance thereby created in the operation of the
grievance procedure. There is no provision for judicial review of a denial
of a money award to an employee while the carrier is given another opportu-
nity to challenge the validity of an adverse money award in a de novo pro-
ceeding.° He concluded that to deprive the unions of the right to strike in
these instances deprives them of their most vital weapon without sub-
stituting a fair and adequate grievance procedure.'°
Section 153 First does not expressly provide for the repeal of incon-
the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary
or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in
this chapter.
44 Stat. 587 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First(p):
If a carrier does not comply with an order of a division of the Adjustment
Board within the time limit in such order, the petitioner, or any person for
whose benefit such order was made, may file in the District Court of the
United States for the district in which he resides or in which is located the
principal operating office of the carrier, or through which the carrier operates,
a petition setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims relief, and the
order of the division of the Adjustment Board in the premises. Such suit in
the District Court of the United States shall proceed in all respects as other
civil suits, except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the
division of the Adjustment Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated, and except that the petitioner shall not he liable for costs in the
district court nor for costs at any subsequent stage of the proceedings . . .
7 190 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Ky. 1961).
8 297 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1961).
9 Section 153 First(p), supra note 6. The reasoning here is that since the carrier
can refuse to comply with the money award of the Adjustment Board, the employee
or union is forced to invoke judicial enforcement of the award under (p). Thus, the
carrier can actually instigate judicial review in a de nova proceeding.
79 The decision in Brotherhood of A.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R.R.,
353 U.S. 30 (1957), relied on heavily by the Court in the principal case, had affirmed
the allowance of an injunction against a threatened strike on the ground that the
grievance machinery provided by section 153 First was a reasonable substitute for the
union's right to strike.
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sistent provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act" if such provisions would
hinder the effectiveness of the policy supporting the RLA. A number of
injunctions have been issued under the RLA to effectuate the design of that
Act, although the injunctions granted were not to restrain a strike as in the
principal case, but were granted to prevent the enforcement of discrimina-
tory agreements between unions and carriers, 12 and to compel a carrier to
deal with a union as the carrier's employees' accredited representative.'s
Apparently, the first case in which an injunction was issued to enjoin
a threatened strike where section 153 was applicable was Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R.R. 14 An injunction was granted
restraining the union from proceeding with a threatened strike pending a
decision of the Adjustment Board on a grievance submitted to it by the rail-
road. The Court ruled that in the light of the legislative intent in creating
the Adjustment Board, the more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act should be accommodated to the specific grievance procedure of sec-
tion 153. 16
While there had been a paucity of cases dealing with injunctive relief
against threatened strikes under section 153 prior to the decision in Chicago
River,' 6 the decisions of the courts in this area evidence a single-mindedness
in giving maximum effect to section 153's capacity to settle minor disputes,
exclusive of other methods available to the parties. Thus, a carrier has been
denied the right to bring a suit for declaratory judgment nullifying an award
of the Adjustment Board,ri and suits brought by employees or unions after
a denial of an award by the Adjustment Board on the same controversy
have been dismissed, either on the ground that the decision of the Board
was res judicata, or on principles of election of remedies.'s The courts would
11 See Hearings on S. 3266 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The Court relied on the hearings on the 1934 Amendment
to the Railway Labor Act, creating the National Adjustment Board, to support its
contention that the grievance machinery was intended as an exclusive means of settling
minor disputes, and that injunctions could issue to this end. However, nowhere in the
Hearings was Norris-LaGuardia specifically mentioned.
12 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Graham v.
Brotherhood of L.F. & E., 338 U.S. 232 (1949) ; Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323
U.S. 192 (1944); Turnstile v. Brotherhood of L.F. & E., 323 U.S. 210 (1944). These
cases did not arise under section 153 First, but under sections 154-155 dealing with the
National Mediation Board.
13 Virginia Ry. v. Federation No. 40, Ry. Employees, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) (pro-
visions of RLA supersede those of Norris-LaGuardia). Here also, the injunction was
not issued under section 153 First.
14 Supra note 10.
16 Id. at 41-42.
16 There have been a number of cases after Chicago River in which the courts have
stated that injunctions to restrain strikes could be granted. See e.g., Brotherhood of
Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 363 U.S. 528 (1960); Order of R.R.
Tel. v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960) (dictum); Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962) (dictum).
17 Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
38 Barnett v. Pennsylvania R. Seashore Lines, 245 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1957);
Bower v. Eastern Airlines, 214 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954); Michel v. Louisville.& N. Ry.,
188 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1951); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 75 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.
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not allow collateral proceedings to challenge the jurisdiction of the Board?"'
The creation of the Adjustment Board and the grievance procedures
established in section 153 20 are peculiar with regard to general labor-manage-
ment relations. The RLA, and the courts' interpretation of it, were in response
to the importance of settling minor disputes without disruptive strikes
and work stoppages in this vital national industry. 2 ' It has been only in
the railway industry that anti-strike injunctions have been allowed contrary
to the provisions of • the Norris-LaGuardia Act. There has been a general
policy development 22
 that labor disputes arising under interpretation of
existing collective bargaining agreements, be settled through conference and
negotiation by the parties. The apparent judicial development of this federal
policy in relation to the court enforced arbitration provisions of collective
bargaining agreements was arrested, however, by the decision in Sinclair
Ref. Co. v. Atkinson. 23
 In Sinclair, the Court ruled the Norris-LaGuardia
Tenn. 1948); Ramsey v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 75 F. Supp. 740 (ND. Ohio 1948);
Berryman v. Pullman Co., 48 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
19 But see, Moore v, Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941), where the Court
upheld a suit for wrongful discharge brought by an employee in a federal district court,
since the procedures of section 153 First had not been invoked. Accord, Manion v.
Kansas City Terminal Co., 353 U.S. 927 (1957) (per curiam).
20 Supra notes 3, 4, 6.
21 The legislative history of the RLA is covered in the Elgin case, supra note 3,
and in Chicago River, supra note 10.
22 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
Textile Workers of. America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). (The Steelworker
cases are hereinafter referred to as the Trilogy.) These suits were brought under the
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 61 Stat. *4 156-158 (1947), 29
U.S.C. II 185-187 (1958), specifically under sections 301(a) and (b) which provide:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect
commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents.
Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf
of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any
money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United
States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and
against its assets, and shall not he enforceable against any individual member
or his assets.
The Court in these cases granted injunctions to the unions to compel the employers
to arbitrate disputes as provided for in the collective bargaining agreements, and re-
fused to review the merits of the controversies. The agreement to arbitrate was found
to be the quid pro quo for the unions' "no strike" clause in the agreement. Lincoln Mills,
supra, at 455. See generally, 14 Lab. L.J. 564 (1963); 18 Arb. J. 65 (1963).
23 370 U.S. 195 (1962). The Court affirmed the denial of an injunction against a
strike by the employees, alleged to be in violation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment containing a "no strike" clause and providing a grievance procedure culminating
in final and binding arbitration of any differences regarding wages, hours or working
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Act to be still applicable, indicating that while Norris-La Guardia may be
detrimental to the success of the Labor Management Relations Act (here-
inafter LMRA), the history of LMRA showed an intent that Norris-
LaGuardia was not to be repealed thereby. 24
The Court in Sinclair distinguished Chicago River on the ground that
in the latter there was an exclusive method of settling disputes under
Section 153 of the RLA, while in the former there was no such machinery pro-
vided that would be inconsistent with the Norris-LaGuardia Act's pro-
scription of federal labor injunctions against strikes and peaceful picketing 2 5
The Court indicated in Sinclair, however, that there were weighty arguments
in favor of modifying Norris-LaGuardia to accommodate Section 301 of
LMRA, but that such modifications were properly a subject of congressional
action.2°
It has been suggested,27 and it is submitted here, that the policies
which the Court has promoted under the RLA, and the accommodation of
Norris-LaGuardia which that policy has necessitated could be equally
applied to disputes coming before the courts under Section 301 of LMRA.
The decision in the principal case lends credence to this proposition. The
case follows the trend of the Court regarding the settlement of minor dis-
putes arising under Section 153 of the RLA. The scope and explicitness
of the grievance machinery and the finality accorded to the awards of the
Adjustment Board under section 153 have been the foundation on which
the Court has premised its power to grant Injunctions restraining strikes
in applicable situations, and conversely, the lack of such explicit machinery
has been the alleged obstruction to the Court acting in an analogous manner
under Section 301 of LMRA. However, Section 153 First(m) of the RLA
expressly indicates that money awards are not final and binding. Therefore,
these awards should not be within the compulsory arbitration scheme of
the statute. The Court still allowed the injunction in the principal case,
even though a money award was involved, on the basis that the enforcement
machinery of section 153 First(p) was available to the union, and to allow
a strike at this juncture would contravene the settlement process which
Congress expressly required to be followed. It may be contended that Sec-
' don 301 of LMRA also provides a settlement process 28 for disputes con-
cerning interpretation of collective bargaining agreements, and strikes
allowed when section 301 has been invoked equally contravene the settlement
process provided by Congress.
conditions. The Court distinguished Lincoln Mills and the Trilogy since the injunctions
to compel the employer to arbitrate did not enjoin conduct which Norris-La Guardia
specifically withdrew from the jurisdiction of federal courts as in this case.
24 Id. at 213. See NLRB Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947. It should be noted, however, that in the debates on LMRA, section 301 was
not expressly considered in relation to Norris-LaGuardia.
25 Id. at 211.
20 Id. at 213-14. For criticism of the Sinclair decision see Kovarsky, Unfair
Labor Practices, Individual Rights and Section 301, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 595 (1963);
Note, 63 Duke L.J. 189 (1963).
27 Comment, 70 Yale L.J. 70 (1961).
28 Supra note 22.
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It is admitted that the legislative history of the RLA provides a firmer
basis for accommodating Norris-LaGuardia, since no preference was shown
therein either for allowing or denying the issuance of injunctions. The
legislative history of LMRA indicates at least a reluctance to allow injunc-
tions in the face of Norris-LaGuardia. However, the unavoidable inference
of the decision in the principal case is that the Court was determined to
effect a sweeping compulsory arbitration process under Section 153 of the
RLA, despite the statutory language as to the non-finality of money awards.
Under similar circumstances and statutory provisions, the Court in Sinclair
refused to make a parallel policy determination on the ground that such
determinations were properly a legislative matter.
The Court's decision in the principal case amounts to judicial legislation
in the area of railway labor-management relations, which the Court has
refused to exercise in other areas of labor-management relations. This con-
tention is further-substantiated by the Court's interpretation of section 153
First(m) and (p). Until the decision in the principal case, it appears that
both courts and commentators had not differentiated between money and
non-money awards of the Adjustment Board." The Court in the principal
case ruled inferentially that subsection (p) referred only to enforcement
of money awards. The dissent expressly stated this to be the proper con-
struction.3° Such being the case, a further problem is precipitated as to what
method is provided for enforcement of non-money awards which would be
final and binding. There is no provision in section 153 for enforcing such
awards on the summary basis that would apparently be required. 3'
Evidently, the Court was so concerned with preserving the integrity of
section 153's compulsory arbitration scheme that it failed to see the dilemma
it was creating. 32 The status of the grievance machinery after the decision
20 Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 253 F.2d 753
(4th Cir. 1958) ; Boos v. Railway Express Agency, 253 F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Thomas
v. New York Cent. & St. L.R.R., 185 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1950); Dahlberg v. Pittsburg
& L.E.R.R., 138 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1943) ; Hanson v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 198 F.
Supp. 325 (S.D. W. Va. 1961). Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board:
A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L.J. 567 (1937); Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 354
(1958). See Brief for Petitioner Union, p. 12; Brief for Respondent Railroad, p. 16.
30 This construction is in keeping with the prior decisions of the Court that non-
money awards are final and binding, and effectuates an adequately sanctioned compulsory
arbitration scheme, since, if a de novo proceeding was required to enforce all awards,
litigation would likely be endless and prompt settlement of disputes virtually impossible.
31 Compare 44 Stat. 587 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 159 First, Second and Third (a),
(b) and (c) (1958) which provide for summary enforcement of an arbitrator's deci-
sion; such arbitration resulting from the parties' own agreement as to the settlement
of disputes.
22 Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent indicated that he thought that enforcement of
non-money awards would be accomplished summarily and not in a de novo proceeding.
He referred to International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S.
682 (1963) to support this proposition. However, that case did not provide for sum-
mary enforcement of awards. It simply held that a federal district court had jurisdic-
tion to hear a suit for enforcement of an award granted by a system board, created
on parallel lines to adjustment boards, to hear airline labor disputes. The Court sug-
gested that the decisions of the system board be given great weight in the enforcement
proceedings in the district court, but did not definitively indicate 'what weight.
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of the principal case would appear to be as follows: (1) The decisions of
the Adjustment Board regarding non-money grievances are final and binding
on both parties; 33 (2) disputes involving money grievances are final and
binding if the union's claim is denied; 34 but (3) if the union is granted a
money award, the railroad can expect judicial review in a de novo pro-
ceeding, by failing to comply with the order of the Board." The principal
case completes the scheme by prohibiting strikes at any stage of the pro-
ceedings once the grievance machinery has been invoked.
There is an obvious imbalance in the grievance procedure accruing to
the benefit of the railroads. It has been contended that this imbalance raises
questions of constitutional magnitude," and as the dissent in the principal
case indicates, deprives the union of a valuable weapon—the threat of
a strike—in the settlement of minor disputes, without substituting an equi-
table grievance procedure.
It may be granted that the policy which the Court has pursued under
section 153 is a salutary one, since to allow a strike at this stage of the
grievance procedure would effectively defeat the value of the section by
removing a compelling incentive to the settlement of miner disputes on the
property, notwithstanding the Court's reluctance to act in an analogous man-
ner in similar disputes arising under Section 301 of LMRA. Yet, the Court
has, in effect, attempted to judicially legislate in the area of railway labor-
management relations. This attempt, developing as it must on a case to
case basis, has resulted in inconsistencies and imbalances, and has created
rights without remedies. This result appears to have been caused by vague
and indefinite legislation on the one hand, and a too purposeful endeavor on
the part of the Court to promote its scheme of labor-management relations
in this limited area. It would appear that the RLA should be reviewed by
the Congress and amended in order to effectuate its policy in an orderly and
equitable manner.
JOSEPH L. DE AMBROSE
Labor Law—Secondary Boycotts—Hot Cargo Clauses—Local 48, Sbeet
Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp.'—Plaintiff Union brought an action in the
district court for damages and injunctive relief to require defendant con-
struction company to comply with the terms of the hot cargo clause con-
tained in the collective bargaining agreement? In arbitration proceedings
33 Supra notes 17, 18.
84 Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959) (Adjustment Board's denial
of a money award was not a money award within the meaning of the statute and
was not therefore final and binding).
35 Supra notes 6, 9.
36 See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548 (1959) (dissenting opinion); Union
Pac. R.R. v. Price, supra note 34 (dissenting opinion).
1 218 F. Supp. 556 (D.C. Ala. 1963).
2 Article II, Section 1 of the collective bargaining agreement reads:
No employer shall subcontract or assign any of the work described herein which
is to be performed at the job site to any contractor, subcontractor or other
4
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